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In the first place, then, it is self-evident, that the existence of the external world cannot be doubted, if we admit that we do, as we naturally believe we do, know it immediately as ex istent. If the fact of the knowledge be allowed, the fact of the existence cannot be gainsaid. The former involves the latter. But, in the second place, it is hardly less manifest, that if our natural belief in the knowledge of the existence of an external world be disallowed as false, that our natural belief in the exist ence of such a world can no longer be founded on as tru Yet, marvellous to say, this has been very generally don For reasons to which we cannot at present advert, it has been almost universally denied by philosophers, that in sensitive per ception we are conscious of any external reality. On the con trary, they have maintained, with singular unanimity, that what we are immediately cognitive of in that act, is only an ideal ottjcct in the mind itself. prev next |