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It is not true that the principal idea of the essence of things is necessary, in order to demonstrate their absolute contra diction ; thousands of times we consider two geometrical figures whose essential property we do not know ; yet not, therefore, do we fail to see that they are different, and that one cannot possibly be the other. Matter, whatever opinion may be entertained of its es sential property, is necessarily a composite being ; matter without parts, is not matter. A composite being, although called owe, inasmuch as its parts are united together, and conspire to the same end, is always a collection of many beings ; for the parts though united are still dis- tinct. If sensation could be predicated of a composite being, the sensitive would not be a single being, but a col lection of beings; but sensation essentially belongs to a being which is one, and if divided is destroyed ; therefore, no composite being, however well organized, is capable of sensation. If we observe what takes place in us, and reason from analogy, to other sensitive beings, we shall discover amid the variety of sensations a single being which perceives them ; it is one and the same being that hears, sees, touches, smells, and tastes ; that remembers sensations after they have disappeared; that seeks them when agreeable, and avoids them when unpleasant, enjoys the former and suffers in the latter. prev next |